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Principled Toleration and Respectful Indifference in the Liberal Polity: A Conceptual 
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Abstract: 
This paper examines toleration at two levels. At the first level, liberal individual is 
concerned that the individual must be as free as possible to pursue their own goals and 
lifestyles. At the second level, liberal political theory is concerned with the value of 
liberal political culture and institutions and how to maintain and protect them. I argue that 
we can learn a great deal about the exercise of toleration and respect at the level of the 
liberal polity by examining them at the level of the liberal individual. Both tolerance and 
intolerance at the level of the polity must be principled. Principled tolerance and 
intolerance have the following features. First, the judgment whether to tolerate a 
particular belief or practice must be based on the value of toleration itself, not pragmatic 
political requirements. Second, it should be an issue of setting aside moral principles and 
convictions rather than dislikes, prejudices or fears. Third, it should respect the 
distinction between the public and the private, and should only recognise an issue as one 
of toleration if there is a public impact at stake. 
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1. Introduction: 
In this paper I set out to map the landscape of toleration in liberal theory, to highlight 
areas that may have been overlooked in previous accounts. Most importantly, I argue that 
we have to discuss the idea and practice of toleration at two distinct levels, that of the 
liberal individual and that of the liberal polity. These two maps, although their share 
some similarities, are also distinctive. We need these two maps because there are two 
levels of liberal theory. First, there is liberal individualism, which is a moral theory 
                                                 
1 This paper expands on arguments originally developed in Cole (2005). This version was 
presented at the RESPECT workshop on Toleration, Respect and Public Space, 
University of Copenhagen, June 21-23, 2010. The RESPECT project is funded under the 
European Commissions Seventh Framework Programme. I would like to thank the 
participants in the workshop for their critical comments on the paper. 
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concerned with the freedom of the individual to pursue their own goals and projects as a 
self-legislator with equal standing with all other liberal self-legislators. Second, there is 
liberal political theory, which is concerned with the value and integrity of liberal 
institutions and liberal political culture. This opens the possibility of conflict and tension 
between these two levels, because individual freedoms must be curtailed to some extent 
in order to protect the value of liberal political institutions and culture. And so the liberal 
polity may refuse to tolerate practices which the liberal individual finds acceptable. There 
is, if you like, private and public toleration, and these have different dimensions. 
 
At the level of the liberal individual, I will argue that what is required is principled 
toleration. Principled toleration at this level means: (i) setting aside convictions and 
principles for the sake of toleration rather than some other more pragmatic goal; (ii) 
setting aside moral convictions and principles rather than prejudices; and (iii) regarding 
only those issues that gives rise to demonstrable public harm as issues of toleration. 
However, what also emerges at the individual level is the importance of indifference 
rather than tolerance. In many important cases, the attitude one would expect from the 
liberal individual towards the beliefs and practices of others is not tolerance, but 
indifference. If one tolerates a certain belief and practice, it follows that one objects to it, 
but there are many beliefs and practices where one would consider toleration to be an 
inappropriate attitude, the expression of a prejudice rather than a moral conviction. 
Although a tolerant racist is preferable to an intolerant one, the right attitude towards the 
fact that someone belongs to a different ‘race’ is surely indifference. Liberal states have 
identified racism, sexism, homophobia and other attitudes as being inappropriate in this 
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sense. However, I will argue, what is required in these cases is respectful indifference, 
rather than ‘mere’ indifference, an indifference that respects the individual’s right to hold 
certain beliefs and practices, or be a particular kind of person, rather than simply a lack of 
care. 
 
At the level of the liberal polity, I will again argue that tolerance must be principled. At 
this level, principled tolerance has the following features: (i) the judgment must be based 
on the value of toleration itself, rather than pragmatic political considerations; (ii) it must 
be the setting aside of public principles and convictions rather than prejudices and fears; 
and (iii) it must respect the distinction between the private and the public sphere, and 
only recognise an issue as one of public toleration is there is a public harm at stake. To 
this extent it looks much like principled toleration at the individual level, but what is 
distinctive is that, while at the individual level, the person who holds the beliefs and 
practices that the liberal individual decides to tolerate does not need to make a special 
case for toleration, at the level of the polity, a claim for exemption has to be made, in that 
an issue of toleration will be an issue of democratic legislation – the liberal individual 
cannot legislate for others, but the liberal polity must legislate for all. But just as public 
toleration must be principled, so must claims for exemption. That is, the claim that a 
particular belief or practice ought to be tolerated by the liberal polity in the face of 
democratic legislation against it must be a matter of moral principle and conscience. This 
means, of course, that we have to be able to tell the difference between principled claims 
for exemption and claims that are simply expressions of prejudices or tradition. This 
raises particular questions about religious claims for exemption, as these are often 
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expressed as issues of moral conviction when, to an external observer, they look like 
expressions of prejudice or traditional practices. I will argue that religious claims have to 
demonstrate that they are principled independent of their religious context. The key 
question for the liberal polity is, then, how to distinguish between genuine issues of moral 
conscience that deserve respect, and unreasonable prejudices that do not.2 
 
2. The liberal individual and toleration: 
At the level of the liberal individual, tolerance is best understood as a virtue and 
intolerance as a vice. Tolerance is an attractive characteristic from the liberal point of 
view, the kind of characteristic one would want to find in a liberal community. 
Intolerance, on the other hand, is an unattractive characteristic.3 For the liberal individual, 
there are two boundaries that need to be mapped. The first is the individual’s boundary 
between those things they find objectionable and those they find unobjectionable (they 
may find many things objectionable or unobjectionable, but for the sake of this discussion 
we will focus on beliefs and practices). They may attach a positive or neutral value to 
those things they find unobjectionable, but attach a negative value to those they find 
objectionable.4 The second boundary is the individual’s boundary of toleration, between 
those things they find objectionable but are prepared to tolerate, and those things they are 
                                                 
2 To be clear, however, the fact that a claim for exemption is principled and therefore 
merits respect as an issue of toleration does not mean that the liberal polity must tolerate 
it. The point is that unprincipled claims of prejudice do not merit any kind of respect and 
should not be considered at all. 
3 Therefore one would expect a liberal community to promote the virtue of tolerance and 
discourage the vice of intolerance; but this is a matter for the liberal polity, not the liberal 
individual. 
4 The positive and neutral values indicate that there is a third boundary here, between 
approval and indifference. I will discuss this later in the paper. 
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not prepared to tolerate. Oddly, on this map the tolerant person is not someone who finds 
very little objectionable, but one who is prepared to tolerate much that they do find 
objectionable; and the intolerant person is not someone who finds a great deal 
objectionable, but one who is not prepared to tolerate much, if anything, that they object 
to. 
 
This means that we can place two more characters alongside the tolerant and intolerant 
persons: the prejudiced person (the one who objects to a great deal whether they are 
prepared to tolerate it or not), and the indifferent person (who does not object to very 
much). This adds a layer of complexity, as the indifferent person can emerge as intolerant 
if they are not prepared to tolerate any of the things they object to, and the prejudiced 
person can emerge as tolerant if they are prepared to put aside their prejudices in the 
majority of cases. Also, the indifferent person can be an unattractive character if their 
indifference arises from a lack of any moral principles or convictions (imagine a liberal 
polity populated by completely indifferent people), and the prejudiced person may be an 
attractive character if they are prepared to set aside their moral convictions on a 
principled basis.5 
 
On the other hand, indifference may be preferable to intolerance. Of course, if one is on 
the receiving end of a prejudice there is an important difference between being 
discriminated against on the basis of that prejudice and being tolerated by the prejudiced 
majority – but there is still something disturbing about the latter case: one may hold that 
                                                 
5 I am aware that I am blurring the difference between a prejudice and a moral conviction 
here, a distinction which will become central to the discussion later. 
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others ought to be indifferent towards one’s beliefs and practices rather than tolerant of 
them. Indifference can, therefore, be a virtue. Although we wanted to say that the tolerant 
individual is an attractive character, there is a possibly negative aspect here, if the 
prejudices they are setting aside are such that we would say they ought not to hold them 
at all. The tolerant racist is, of course, preferable to the intolerant racist, but this is not a 
prejudice they should hold at all. There are, therefore, certain beliefs and practices – and 
other things – which people should not object to as such.  
 
One requirement at the level of the liberal individual is that tolerance must be principled.6  
Tolerance can be principled in three ways. First, the setting aside of principles and 
convictions must have an ethical basis. We need to know that the tolerant person’s 
convictions are being set aside because of moral principles. The exercise of tolerance is 
not always principled. Sometimes moral convictions can be set aside because of moral 
cowardice or opportunism or self-interested bargaining. Either that, or we refuse to call 
the setting aside of convictions on anything other than a principled basis the exercise of 
tolerance at all.7  
 
The second way in which toleration must be principled is closely related to the first, in 
that we have said that principled toleration requires the setting aside of moral convictions 
and principles, and this means we have to distinguish between this and the setting aside 
of mere prejudices. It cannot be that we simply find a certain practice distasteful and 
                                                 
6 Brian Leiter also refers to principled toleration in much the same sense. See Leiter 
(2010), p.7 and pp. 9-10. 
7 See Leiter, pp.7-9. 
 7 
would rather it didn’t happen but are prepared to let it continue. We have to be able to 
articulate a moral argument concerning it for this to be a question of toleration. This 
connects with our concern that there are certain beliefs and practices which the liberal 
individual should have no objection to, and which therefore should not be issues of 
toleration at all. This is a very difficult boundary to draw and takes us to the heart of the 
issue, the difference between moral convictions and unreasonable prejudices, and the 
possibility of setting out some kind of objective criteria for this distinction. Without such 
criteria, the liberal problem of toleration seems incapable of resolution on any principled 
basis. Personally, I would place a person’s ‘racial’ identity and sexuality on this list, and 
so do not find the tolerant racist or tolerant homophobe attractive characters. The liberal 
tradition recognises this distinction with the naming of certain prejudices – such as 
racism, sexism, homophobia and disablism – and through their naming signalling their 
unacceptability.  
 
But how are we to theorise this boundary? There are two possible dimensions here, one to 
do with harm, the other to do with the private/public distinction. Firstly, it is difficult to 
see how one can object to any belief and practice unless it can be shown to be harmful. 
Remember that here we are talking about a certain kind of objection, a disapproval based 
on moral conviction, a disapproval so strong that we find some beliefs and practices 
intolerable. The tipping point between indifference and tolerance, and indeed often into 
intolerance, will be whether and the extent to which the belief or practice in question 
causes harm. The second way of understanding the boundary here is to make the 
distinction between the private and the public. As a liberal individual, I have no reason to 
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object to beliefs, practices or anything else that takes place in another individual’s private 
sphere and have no effect any other member of the polity. However, the question of harm 
complicates this boundary, because one may have strong moral objections to people 
harming others even though that harm is consensual, and indeed strong moral objections 
to forms of self-harm which involve only the individual. All I can say here is that these 
cases are complex and difficult, and there is no clear answer to the question whether we, 
as liberal individuals, are obliged to tolerate consensual or self-harm. However, we can 
say that an extremely strong case would have to be made for intolerance in such cases. 
 
And so what we expect from the liberal individual is principled toleration: principled 
because it involves the setting aside of convictions and principles for the sake of 
tolerance and not some other goal; because it is the setting aside of moral convictions and 
principles; and because there must be, in the vast majority of cases, a demonstrable public 
harm to make this a matter of toleration at all. The corollary is, of course, that liberal 
intolerance must be equally principled. I will explore what liberal intolerance might look 
like below. 
 
3. The liberal individual and respectful indifference: 
We observed above that indifference is preferable to tolerance in certain cases, and the 
strongest sense in which this holds is where those beliefs and practices have no harmful 
public effect – any harm is confined to the private sphere, if there is any harm at all. But 
even where indifference is preferable to tolerance, there is a preference for principled 
indifference, rather than indifference which arises because one has few moral convictions 
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and principles of one’s own. If I am indifferent to a belief or practice in an unprincipled 
way, there is no reason to show it any degree of respect at all, and indeed my general lack 
of principles may lead me to do things that could potentially harm that to which I am 
indifferent. Suppose you possess a painting that you consider to be a work of art but to 
which I am indifferent. Because I am indifferent to it, what happens to it does not matter 
to me, and that includes what happens to it because of my own actions. If I need 
notepaper, I could use the painting to make notes on in indelible ink. However, principled 
indifference would mean that I recognise your view of it as constituting a reason to 
constrain my actions towards it. Setting aside the question of respect for property rights, I 
constrain my actions towards it simply on the basis of respecting your view of the value 
of the painting.  
 
However, rather than talk of principled indifference, it might be better to describe this as 
respectful indifference, as indifference implies strongly that there are no moral 
convictions and principles at stake here. What is at stake here is not moral principle, but a 
duty of respect. In exploring this idea of respectful indifference I draw heavily on the 
work of Brian Leiter and the distinction he makes between thin and thick concepts of 
respect, which he in turn builds on Stephen Darwall’s distinction between recognition 
(thin) respect and appraisal (thick) respect.8 Recognition respect involves “giving 
appropriate consideration or recognition to some features of its object in deliberating 
what to do”,9 for example “by being willing to constrain one’s behaviour in ways 
                                                 
8 Darwall (1977). 
9 Darwall (1977), p.38; Leiter (2010), p. 4. 
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required” by those features.10 In short: “Recognition respect for persons … is identical 
with recognition respect for the moral requirements that are placed on one by the 
existence of other persons”.11 In other words, my recognition of their existence as being 
appropriate grounds for constraining my behaviour is sufficient for recognition respect. 
 
For Leiter, this is a thin respect on two grounds: First, “it is agnostic about any other 
dimension of value that might attach to the particular manifestations of the features of the 
object to which the respect is owed…”. The only value attached to the object by this form 
of respect is that I must recognise its existence as a reason for constraining my behaviour 
towards it – I make no judgment as to its value in any other sense. Second, “…it is silent 
on the nature of the ‘moral’ constraints on behaviour that are demanded by the respect”.12 
It does not specify how my behaviour should be constrained by the demands of this 
respect – I have a reason to constrain my behaviour, but the way in which my behaviour 
ought to be constrained is not given by my respect for the object. 
 
For Darwall, appraisal respect “consists in an attitude of positive appraisal of that person 
either as a person or as engaged in some particular pursuit”.13 It is “like esteem or high 
regard for someone”, and is compatible with having no “particular conception of just 
what behaviour from oneself would be required or made appropriate by that person’s 
having the features meriting such respect”.14 Leiter gives the following examples: 
                                                 
10 Darwall (1977), p.45; Leiter (2010), p.4. 
11 Darwall (1977), p.45; Leiter (2010), p.4. 
12 Leiter (2010), pp.4-5. 
13 Darwall (1977), p.38; Leiter (2010), p.5. 
14 Darwall (1977), p.39; Leiter (2010), p.5. 
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respecting someone’s feelings is recognition (thin) respect – “you act in such a way as to 
show an appropriate moral regard for how your actions might affect them”; respecting 
someone’s intellect is appraisal (thick) respect – “you admire and appraise highly the 
calibre of her mind”.15 
 
If we return to my example of your painting, I give it recognition respect by recognising 
that its existence as a painting you value constrains my behaviour towards it, so I cannot 
scribble over it – this is the attitude I have called respectful indifference. I give it 
appraisal respect if I believe it to be a work of art, and that value gives me a reason to 
constrain my behaviour towards it – I am not indifferent to it at all, but attach a value to 
it. For Leiter, thin respect “makes no substantive moral demand on the kind of action that 
is appropriate…”.16 The only requirement is that we honour whatever the moral 
requirements are that are placed on us by the existence of the other. “The substantive 
content of these moral requirements is open…”. Leiter agrees with Leslie Green that this 
thin version of respect is “morally otiose” – it is “only an exhortation to do the (other) 
duties that we already owe”.17 So my recognition respect for your painting may amount 
only to the recognition that I must constrain my behaviour towards it according to the 
rules that already exist around respect for other people’s property. In my earlier version 
of the example of the painting where I set aside the consideration of property rights and 
based my respect only on the recognition that you value the painting, I may have been 
                                                 
15 Leiter (2010), p.5. 
16 Leiter (2010), p.6. 
17 Green (2010), p. 213. 
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moving beyond the limits of the thin requirements of recognition respect. All that form of 
respect seems to demand is that I recognise the rules that apply to object already.  
 
For Leiter, appraisal respect also “makes no substantive moral demand” on action, but for 
a different reason – “it demands only ‘esteem’ or high appraisal of certain features of 
persons, not that one act towards them in a certain way”.18 However, appraisal respect 
can also result in “moral demands on action, when the highly appraised features are ones 
with moral value or that one has a moral obligation to support or protect”.19 And so if I 
only have recognition respect for your painting, if you choose to destroy it I have no 
reason to intervene to protect it – the general respect for other people’s property places 
me under no obligation to intervene to maintain that property. However, if I have 
appraisal respect for your painting as an important work of art, I do have a reason to 
ensure that it is adequately protected because I attach value to it, such that if you do not 
have the means, or the inclination, to maintain and protect it, I should do so if I can. 
 
For Leiter, toleration does not take us beyond the requirements of recognition respect. If I 
choose to tolerate a particular practice, then I must constrain my behaviour in such a way 
that there is room for it to take place, but there is no positive obligation on my part to 
sustain or protect that practice. Equally, if I am respectfully indifferent to it, I recognise 
its existence as a reason to constrain my behaviour towards it, but there is no further 
requirement on my part to sustain or protect that practice further. In that sense principled 
toleration and respectful indifference look the same in practice. The difference is that in 
                                                 
18 Leiter (2010), p.6. 
19 Leiter (2010), p.6. 
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the case of principled toleration I attach a negative value to the practice but am willing to 
allow it to continue and so do not interfere, while in the case of respectful indifference I 
attach neutral value to the practice but respect your right to continue it and so, again, do 
not interfere. The importance of respectful indifference at the individual level is 
normative, perhaps, rather than practical – it is the attitude the liberal individual ought to 
have towards many beliefs, practices and other things, such even principled toleration in 
these cases is to be deplored.  
 
One implication of both principled toleration and respectful indifference is that, at the 
level of the individual, I am only obliged to protect that practice from any interference 
from me, not from others. However, does recognition respect (whether embodied in 
indifference or tolerance) require me to protect that practice from interference by others? 
I have a reason to modify my behaviour in respect to the object, but must everybody else 
share that reason? Certainly, I may think that they should, but I cannot require that they 
should – I cannot require that all other people’s boundaries of toleration, nor indeed their 
boundaries of indifference, should fall in the same place as mine. Whether those 
boundaries are laid down in public practice or law is, of course, an issue for the liberal 
polity. To conclude the discussion of toleration at the level of the liberal individual, what 
we have learnt is the importance of respectful indifference as a virtue in the liberal polity, 
alongside, and indeed often more virtuous than, principled tolerance. 
 
3. The liberal polity and toleration: 
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The practice of toleration at the level of the liberal polity has the boundary between the 
‘public’ and the ‘private’ at its centre. A tolerant community is one that allows that a 
wide range of issues are matters of individual choice rather than collective decision – 
they are private, not public, matters. These are issues that are characteristically to do with 
individual ‘lifestyle’ choices, and in a liberal polity there is a list of such issues which are 
taken to be unproblematically private: that list normally includes decisions about what 
clothes to wear, what food to eat, what music one listens to or creates, what literature one 
reads or writes, choice of work and career, the choice of one’s partner and whether or not 
to marry them, how many children one has as a family. We should note, of course, that 
there is no clear private/public boundary here, in that we cannot draw a distinction 
between matters that have no effect on collective life and those that do – we know that 
potentially anything one does can have an impact on public life. However, these issues 
are still judged to be private in that the effect they have is negligible or where there is one 
it is benign. 
 
There have been, and still are, societies which have taken a very different view, and 
which have been prepared to take collective decisions about what work people do, what 
literature they should read or write, whether or not they marry their partners, how many 
children they should have, what clothing they should wear, and so on. These societies 
have been, from a liberal point of view, intolerant ones, in which there has been very 
little space for individual choice. But we should keep in mind that the line between the 
private and the public has been drawn in different places in liberal societies. Certainly, 
our choice of partner has been highly controversial in traditionally liberal societies, with 
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recognition of the validity of same-sex partnerships only growing in scope very recently. 
And it is always possible that other issues on this list – for example, what clothes one 
wears – could be judged to have a public impact and so a matter for collective decision. 
Belgium voted to ban the wearing of full Islamic face veils in public places in April 2010, 
and France imposed a similar ban in April 2011.20 And so while the space for private 
decision is genuinely wider in liberal polities than in other kinds of state, this space is 
always open to revision.  
 
But while the public/private boundary has a place at both the individual and collective 
level, the concern at the individual level is the impact of beliefs and practices upon 
individuals, while at the collective level there is the additional concern of the impact of 
those beliefs and practices on political institutions and the political culture.21 From the 
point of view of liberal political theory, we must ask whether those practices are 
compatible with a liberal political culture and the institutions that make it up. While the 
liberal polity may also be concerned about questions of tolerance over issues of morality 
(are there beliefs and practices which are simply too immoral for a liberal polity to 
tolerate?), and offensiveness (are there beliefs and practices which are simply too 
offensive to the general community for the polity to tolerate them?), the issue I want to 
                                                 
20 Even here, though, the public/private dimension to the issue remains significant in that 
the ban would only apply to public places (and there are differences over what counts as 
public places where such a ban would be justifiable). 
21 See Ceva (2010), pp. 13-14. 
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look at here is the question of this impact on the integrity of liberal political institutions 
and political culture.22 
 
One issue that is of current concern for liberal polities is religious belief, and this is partly 
a concern about cohesiveness – to what extent can the polity tolerate religious diversity 
without undermining the integrity of liberal political culture? This takes us into broader 
areas of tension between cultural diversity and cultural identity, but religious identity has 
been taken to be particularly problematic because of the intensity of religious beliefs – 
they are, it seems from experience, more likely to pose problems than other forms of 
diversity.23 From the point of view of liberal political theory, the questions must be: what 
kinds of religious belief and practice genuinely threaten to undermine liberal political 
culture and institutions? And to what extent is a liberal polity entitled to override 
individual religious freedom and autonomy for the sake of community integrity?  
 
The latter question is a difficult one because community cohesiveness is not a specifically 
liberal value while individual freedom and autonomy are, and so where non-liberal values 
clash with core liberal values, we might make a reasonable assumption that in a liberal 
polity the non-liberal values should normally give way. In a genuine liberal polity there 
must therefore be a strong presumption in favour of religious and other forms of 
diversity, even where that diversity is, to some extent, divisive. Just as principled 
toleration at the level of the liberal individual entails that I tolerate practices that have 
                                                 
22 There are, of course, connections with the questions of immorality and offensiveness, 
but I will not directly address them here – see Cole (2005). 
23 Certainly, the United Kingdom government is concerned about preventing extremism 
in communities. See www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/uk-13679360. Accessed June 9, 2011. 
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some degree of public impact on my life, toleration at the level of the liberal polity entails 
that it tolerate some degree or forms of cultural diversity which cause communal 
divisiveness – otherwise, what is there to tolerate? Here the tension between liberal 
individualism and liberal political theory is settled in favour of the individualist morality 
of freedom and autonomy.  
 
However, there will be limits to toleration here, where the tension is going to be settled in 
favour of liberal political institutions and culture, and so some judgment must be made 
between those divisive cultural differences that are to be tolerated and those that are 
intolerable. This is an extremely complex judgment, but it will have something to do with 
the extent to which liberal political institutions and culture can cope with the damage 
caused by the divisiveness – we can assume from experience that they are robust enough 
to withstand some degree of cultural divisiveness, but there will be limits beyond which 
they begin to disintegrate in ways they cannot recover from. Where those limits lie 
cannot be determined by philosophical argument alone. For now, though, we can say that 
a liberal polity is tolerant to the extent that it allows beliefs and practices that are 
incompatible with liberal political institutions and culture.  
 
We have seen that principled toleration would require the liberal polity to permit space 
for beliefs and practices that are actually incompatible with liberal political culture. We 
have also seen that there are limits to which the liberal polity can play host to such beliefs 
and practices, but have avoided trying to identify where those limits lie. The question for 
now is what constitutes toleration here, and again religious belief is a key example, 
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because there is a significant level of debate about the policy of exempting religious 
believers from legal requirements that are binding on other members of the liberal polity 
out of respect for their religious beliefs. There are such exemptions in the United 
Kingdom, for example those concerning the slaughter of animals for consumption, in that 
certain religious groups are permitted to slaughter animals in ways that would otherwise 
be illegal. Animals slaughtered in Jewish and Islamic procedures are not stunned before 
slaughter. Although there is dispute about whether the methods used are humane, there is 
little doubt that the majority of people in the United Kingdom object to animals not being 
stunned before slaughter, and so the exemption of these practices is a prime example of 
toleration, not respectful indifference.  
 
What we have to ask, of course, is whether this is principled toleration. Above I 
identified three ways in which toleration must be principled at the level of the individual. 
Firstly, I distinguished toleration from ‘toleration’ based on moral cowardice or 
opportunism or self-interested bargaining. Similarly, at the level of the polity we would 
expect toleration to be principled in the same way, but what moral principles can underlie 
principled toleration at the public level? There seem to be three possibilities. First, we see 
the exercise of tolerance as a good in itself, in that it improves the moral character of the 
individual, and this overrides their moral objections to other practices or ideas, etc. This 
is something like the rationale for tolerance we find in Stoicism. Second, we see the 
exercise of individual autonomy as good for people, and so it is better to allow them to 
explore different avenues and pathways which we may consider objectionable, rather 
than intervening to prevent them from doing so. This is one rationale for tolerance we 
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find within liberal individualism. Third, while we have moral principles and convictions, 
we hold an epistemological scepticism about their basis, so that we are not in a position 
to know that the opposing principles and convictions held by others are mistaken, and it 
would therefore be unethical to impose our own principles and convictions upon them. 
Again, this is a rationale for tolerance we find within liberal individualism. All of these 
could apply to principled toleration at the level of the polity: first, that the exercise of 
tolerance is a key characteristic of a developed liberal polity, and is therefore something 
that should be developed for its own sake; second, that it is better for its citizens to 
exercise freedom and autonomy than be directed by the state; and third, that the state is 
not in a position to know what is best for its citizens in most cases.  
 
The second way in which we said individual toleration must be principled was closely 
related to the first, that it requires the setting aside of moral convictions rather than basic 
prejudices – a moral argument is required. At the level of the polity this means constraint 
with respect to beliefs and practices that people simply find distasteful, and the demand 
for a moral case for intolerance. One way of giving this distinction a reasoned basis is to 
draw a distinction between the private and the public, and to say that the third 
requirement for principled toleration is that there must be a demonstrable public effect to 
make an issue a matter of toleration at all, and we have already seen that the question of 
toleration at the level of the polity is largely concerned with the boundary between the 
public and the private. And so what we expect from the liberal polity in terms of 
principled toleration is that it involves the setting aside of people’s moral convictions and 
principles for the sake of maintaining and developing the characteristic of tolerance as an 
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aspect of liberal political culture and institutions; and that there must be, in most cases, a 
demonstrable public effect at stake.  
 
We can now build up a picture of what principled intolerance looks like at the public 
level. First, it will be based on moral principles central to the liberal political culture, 
including the value of tolerance itself – there is a presumption against tolerating the 
intolerant practices of groups in the liberal polity. Second, the judgment will be based on 
the impact of beliefs and practices upon the liberal political culture – this reinforces the 
presumption against the intolerant practices of groups, as this would undermine the 
overall culture of tolerance which is a sign of a mature liberal polity. Third, it will be 
based on the impact of those practices upon individual members of the polity – they must 
be protected from being harmed by the beliefs and practices of other members, including 
intolerant beliefs and practices. That the majority believe that a practice is immoral or 
offensive is not a factor. They have individual reasons to avoid or argue against that 
practice, but the polity has no principled reason for acting against it. To ban or limit a 
practice because the majority find it offensive is certainly an example of intolerance, but 
it cannot be principled intolerance. And so we have a description of principled tolerance 
and intolerance at the level of the liberal polity.  
 
5. The liberal polity and exemptions: 
Emanuela Ceva argues that there are two sets of conditions a claim for conscientious 
exemption must meet if the liberal polity is to grant it.24 The first set of conditions is 
                                                 
24 Ceva (2010), pp. 12-13. 
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concerned with whether there is a genuine claim of conscientious exemption here which 
merits respect and should therefore be considered. The second set of conditions are 
concerned with whether the liberal polity can bear the cost of granting the exemption. 
This second set of conditions asks: (1) whether the exemption would undermine the 
general validity of the law and the pursuit of the values/ interests it was meant to protect; 
and (2) whether the exemption is sensitive to the threshold of collateral damages a society 
can tolerate. Applicants for exemption need to know whether they are refused because 
their request isn’t morally justified or because “its satisfaction would impose 
unacceptable burdens on their social partners.”25 Here I want to focus on the first set of 
conditions, which determine whether the claim to exemption is morally justified in the 
first place.  
 
According to Ceva, there are three conditions here: (1) The request cannot be for 
exemption from perfect duties of the claimant, which would lead to the violation of 
fundamental rights of others; (2) The request must not be opportunistic; (3) The request 
must have direct moral relevance for the claimant. Condition (2) means that “there should 
be publicly accessible reasons showing that the claimant’s case is not merely an excuse to 
escape the costs of social cooperation, but involves her very moral integrity. What makes 
for a publicly accessible reason would depend on the public values informing the political 
life of the polity within which the claim for exemption is raised.”26 Such reasons would 
appeal to “generally accepted principles (e.g. non-discrimination) or wide spread – 
                                                 
25 Ceva (2010), p. 14. 
26 Ceva (2010), p. 12. 
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through controversial – moral views (e.g. protection of Life in all its forms.”27 Ceva 
observes: “…a mere appeal to cultural membership will not do.”28 
 
What follows from Ceva’s conditions is, I think, that for a claim of exemption to merit 
respect, it must itself be principled, and again what we mean is that it must be based on 
moral convictions and principles – it must be an issue of conscience. But how do we tell 
that a claim is a genuine issue of conscience? For Ceva, matters of conscience arise 
where a person’s “moral integrity” is at risk if they were to comply: “someone’s moral 
integrity is preserved when that person can act in accordance with her conscience.”  
In a liberal polity, “…citizens should be allowed the largest possible room to give voice 
to their consciences and act in accordance with their utterances, within certain limits, as 
this is a fundamental condition for them to exercise their capacity for self-legislation 
(however rationally that is conducted).”29 
 
Martha Nussbaum has identified moral conscience as “the faculty in human beings with 
which they search for life’s ultimate meaning,”30 but Ceva says this only captures the 
religious dimension of conscience, and so is unnecessarily narrow. Conscience is, more 
broadly, the “faculty to discern what is morally right or wrong.” And so “when someone 
appeals to her conscience in public, she is making a statement of what morality demands 
of her…”.31 
                                                 
27 Ceva (2010), pp. 12-13. 
28 Ceva (2010), p. 13. 
29 Ceva (2010), p. 6. 
30 Ceva (2010), p. 6. Nussbaum (2010), p. 19. 
31 Ceva (2010), p. 6. 
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Ceva agrees with James Childress’ view that a violation of conscience would result in “a 
fundamental loss of integrity, wholeness, and harmony in the self.”32 She says,  “…not all 
obstacles to self-legislation should be considered a sufficient basis for refusing 
compliance with a democratically deliberated law, but only those threatening the person’s 
moral integrity.”33 Her example is of a person with an interest in wine tasting who can 
only get to the vineyards by driving themselves, but who is prevented from doing so 
because of the laws limiting alcohol consumption when in charge of a vehicle. Such a 
person would have to show “that driving around restaurants to drink fine wines is an 
inherent component of the conception of her own moral self and that not doing so would 
put her moral integrity at risk…”.34 This, then, is the key test we identified at the start of 
this paper: how to distinguish between claims to exemption which are expressions of 
prejudice or self-interest or simply of tradition, and those which are genuinely matters of 
moral conscience and integrity. 
 
6. Religious claims to exemption: 
I want to conclude this discussion with some observations about religious claims to 
exemption in particular, and claims based on traditional practices in general. There are 
two questions here: (i) Do claims based on religious belief merit respect simply because 
they have a religious context?; and (ii) Do claims based on traditional practice merit 
respect simply because people have followed those traditions for a very long time? As we 
                                                 
32 Ceva (2010), p. 7. Childress (1979), p. 318. 
33 Ceva (2010), p. 10. 
34 Ceva (2010), p. 10. 
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shall see below, I think these questions are connected. On the first question, Martha 
Nussbaum believes that they do because it is religious beliefs that most completely 
capture the “faculty in human beings in which they search for life’s ultimate meaning.” 
Brian Leiter offers a powerful counter-argument, concluding that as religious beliefs, 
when subjected to ordinary standards of judgment, turn out to be culpably false beliefs,35 
there are no reasons that would “support the conclusion that religious matters of 
conscience warrant esteem or reverence.”36 I find Leiter’s arguments persuasive, and 
believe religious claims have to be judged on the same basis as other claims – they have 
to be principled, based on moral grounds and open to critique on the basis of normal 
standards of rational debate. The crucial point is that those moral grounds have to be 
independent of the religious context, in the sense that they cannot simply be statements of 
religious dogma. To state that a religious believer should be free to, for example, 
discriminate against homosexuals because their religious text states this as a rule cannot 
be acceptable to the liberal polity as the basis of a claim for exemption.  
 
This becomes clearer if we look at the second question, of the status of tradition, because 
very often religious claims for exemption are not to do with beliefs as such, but with 
practices. Here I follow Daniel Weinstock’s observation of the “…fact that religion has to 
do not just with individual belief but also with communal practice and ritual. People 
worship in groups. What’s more, for many religious persons, practice is more important 
than belief. That is, the question of whether the metaphysical claims made in the holy 
texts of their religions are true or not is far less important than is the requirement of 
                                                 
35 Leiter (2010), pp.24-29. 
36 Leiter (2010), p. 29. 
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remaining true to tradition, to taking part in a certain range of practices that bind the 
individual to community both synchronically and diachronically.”37 
 
We have seen that a principled claim for exemption has to be based on independent moral 
grounds and open to rational questioning. A moral challenge to a particular practice 
cannot be answered by the statement: “We have always done it this way.” And yet very 
often, in the case of religious practices, there is no other answer available. This, of 
course, raises a challenge for all kinds of traditional practices and rituals, not just 
religious ones. In the United Kingdom hunting animals with dogs was banned in 2005, 
but opponents of the ban argued that it was a traditional part of country life.  
 
Similarly, there was much controversy leading up to the passing of the Equality Act in 
the United Kingdom in April 2010. That Act made it clear that religious organisations 
such as adoption agencies could not, for example, discriminate against gay couples. I will 
not explore any specific cases here, but will make the observation that any claim to the 
right to discriminate against gay people on religious grounds clashes directly with 
principled toleration in a liberal polity. We identified three issues for the liberal polity 
when making judgments about exemptions: first, there is a presumption against tolerating 
practices which are themselves intolerant, as tolerance is a core value for the liberal 
polity and must, as it were, go all the way down; second, there is a presumption against 
tolerating practices that have a harmful impact on the political culture of the liberal polity 
                                                 
37 Daniel Weinstock, “Beyond Objective and Subjective: Assessing the Legitimacy of 
Religious Claims to Accommodation”, paper presented at RESPECT workshop on 
Toleration, Respect and Public Space, University of Copenhagen, June 21-23, 2010. 
 26 
in terms of its values and institutions, such as moral equality; and third, there is a 
presumption against tolerating practices that will have a harmful impact on individual 
members of the community. Religious claims for exemption to discriminate against gay 
people seem to clash with all these presumptions.  
 
But we have identified a fourth requirement, that any claim to exemption must itself be 
principled – that is, it must be based on genuine moral convictions and principles, not 
mere prejudices. The fact that a claim to exemption has a religious context does not help 
us to distinguish principled claims from prejudiced ones; nor, obviously, does the fact 
that a practice has a traditional context. Many of the prejudices that liberal societies have 
justifiably overcome and outlawed in their long and difficult struggle to become liberal 
societies have had a religious context and long historical traditions.  
 
One difficulty here is that people with religious beliefs concerning homosexuality and 
lesbianism see those beliefs as moral convictions, as matters of moral principle and 
integrity, and therefore as issues of conscience. Here we have the central clash between 
objective and subjective standpoints. From the objective standpoint, the liberal polity has 
identified racism, sexism, homophobia and other ‘attitudes’ as unreasonable and 
unacceptable prejudices, and so the religious claim for exemption does not require 
respect.  From the subjective standpoint of the religious believer, they are experiencing a 
moral command which conflicts with a democratically established law, and so their claim 
to exemption merits respect. 
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I have no test to offer which can tell us the difference between a moral conviction and an 
unreasonable prejudice, but what follows from that is not an impasse. We have 
distinguished between the standpoint of the liberal individual and the liberal polity, 
between private and public issues of toleration. It may be that the private standpoint of 
the liberal individual has to be tilted towards the subjective38 but the public standpoint of 
the liberal polity has to be tilted towards the objective. It still has to arrive at a judgment 
about what kind of belief counts as a moral conviction, one which has to be respected 
(but not necessarily granted) as a claim to exemption, but the UK Equality Act itself 
contains a definition of what it terms a ‘philosophical belief’, the type of belief that 
merits respect and protection of the law, be it religious or otherwise.  
 
The definition is such that: “…it must be genuinely held; be a belief and not an opinion 
or viewpoint based on the present state of information available; be a belief as to a 
weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour; attain a certain level of 
cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance; and be worthy of respect in a democratic 
society, compatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of 
others.” 39 It is difficult to see how any exemption claim by religious organizations that 
would give them the right to discriminate against homosexuals and lesbians in any of 
their practices could meet this threshold requirement. 
References: 
                                                 
38 Even at the private level, practices which harm others cannot be tolerated, but if a 
religious believer chooses not to associate with gay people in their strictly private affairs, 
this does not constitute harm. 
39 http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2010/en/ukpgaen_20100015_en_1: section 10, 
paragraph 52, accessed June 7, 2010. 
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